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November 11, 2003 
Abstract 
We examine announcement period excess returns to acquirers of listed and unlisted targets in 17 
Western European countries over the interval 1996 through 2001.  Acquirers of listed targets 
earn an insignificant average excess return of –0.38%, while acquirers of unlisted targets earn a 
significant average excess return of +1.48%.  This “listing effect” in acquirers’ returns persists 
through time and across countries and remains after controlling for method of payment for the 
target, the acquirer’s size and Tobin’s Q, the “liquidity” of the target, whether the acquisition 
created a blockholder in the acquirer’s ownership structure, whether the acquisition was a cross-
border deal, and other variables.  The fundamental factors that give rise to the listing effect, 
which has also been documented in U.S. acquisitions, remain elusive.   
Wealth Creation for Acquirers of Listed and Unlisted Targets 
 
 A persistent phenomenon in studies of U.S. acquisitions is that acquirers achieve zero or 
negative announcement period excess returns when acquiring listed targets and positive 
announcement period excess returns when acquiring unlisted targets (Chang (1998), Fuller, 
Netter and Stegemoller (2002), Hansen and Lott (1996) and Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz 
(2003)).  Additionally, when unlisted targets are separately categorized as stand-alone companies 
and subsidiaries of other firms, bidders earn positive excess returns when acquiring targets from 
either category. 
 Various hypotheses have been proffered to explain this phenomenon.  Chang (1998) 
proposes that acquisitions of unlisted targets with payment made in stock often create 
blockholders who act as effective monitors of the bidder’s management with the presumed 
consequence that such monitors lead to improved performance by the acquirer.  Consistent with 
his argument, for unlisted targets, he reports that acquirers’ returns are higher when payment is 
made in stock and when the acquisition creates a new blockholder in the acquirer’s ownership 
structure.  Fuller et al (2002) offer up a number of possible explanations.  Prominent among them 
is the conjecture that the acquirer gains because it is reaping an "illiquidity" discount when 
buying unlisted targets.  However, they do not test this hypothesis.  Hansen and Lott (1996) 
hypothesize that shareholders of publicly-traded acquirers own diversified portfolios that include 
the shares of other listed companies, but do not (and cannot) include the shares of privately held 
companies.  For this reason, they argue, given conservation of values, shareholders do not care 
when managers “over pay” for publicly-traded targets because any loss in value for the buyer is 
merely a transfer to the target company’s shareholders.  Acquisition of an unlisted target is a 
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different matter because those are not part of the acquirers’ shareholders’ portfolios so the 
acquirers’ shareholders will, therefore, insist that only value-increasing acquisitions of private 
targets be undertaken.   
Moeller et al (2003) conduct an exhaustive examination of 12,023 listed and unlisted 
acquisitions by U.S. bidders over the period 1980 through 2001.  They focus on the size of the 
bidder as a determinant of acquirers’ returns rather than whether the target is listed.  
Nevertheless, they provide tantalizing evidence on the effect of the listing status of the target on 
acquirers’ returns.  In particular, in cross-sectional regressions, they find that the size of the 
acquirer is a key determinant of the acquirer’s announcement period excess return with bigger 
bidders being worse bidders.  Though they do not discuss it in any detail and do not explore the 
question further, they also report that unlisted stand-alone targets and unlisted subsidiary targets 
provide significantly larger excess returns to acquirers than do acquisitions of listed targets and 
this result appears to be robust to the size of the acquirer.  (Henceforth, we refer to this as the 
“listing effect” in acquirer returns.)  One further possible explanation of the listing effect is that it 
is a spurious finding that is unique to the time period chosen for the analysis.  Given that these 
studies tend to encompass similar, but not overlapping, time periods, that is a possible, but 
unlikely, explanation.  Or it could be that the effect has nothing to do with listing status per se, 
but rather it is unique to the U.S. because of some institutional or regulatory factor that is also 
unique to the U.S.   
 In this study, we explore the listing effect to determine its generality.  We do so by 
examining excess returns around announcements of acquisitions in 17 Western European 
countries.  We find that the effect is widespread.  Over the interval 1996 through 2001, for a 
sample of 4,429 completed acquisitions, acquirers earn an insignificant average excess return of 
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–0.38% around announcements of acquisitions of listed targets and a significant positive average 
excess return of 1.48% around announcements of acquisitions of unlisted stand-alone targets and 
subsidiaries.  Furthermore, this effect is present in the full sample and for individual countries in 
which there are enough observations to conduct meaningful tests.  Additionally, the effect occurs 
for unlisted free-standing targets and unlisted subsidiary targets.  Moreover, the effect persists 
after controlling for the size of the bidder, whether a blockholder is created in the bidder, the 
method of payment, the “liquidity” of the target’s assets, the relative size of the target, the 
bidder’s Tobin’s Q, whether the acquisition is a cross-border deal, and whether the acquirer and 
the target come from the same industry.  Indeed, in cross-sectional regressions in which the 
acquirer’s announcement period excess return is the dependent variable, the only independent 
variables that are significant are the bidder’s size (i.e., the acquirer’s market value of equity) and 
whether the target is an unlisted free-standing company or an unlisted subsidiary.  Thus, the 
listing effect and the size effect in acquirers’ stock returns both appear to be universal 
phenomena.  We explore a number of possible explanations for the listing effect in acquirers’ 
announcement period stock returns.  These various explanations fall short of identifying the 
underlying cause of the listing effect.  Regardless of its cause, the listing effect appears to be 
universal.  Acquirers appear to do better for their shareholders by acquiring unlisted targets. 
 The next section describes our data and sample.  Section II considers whether the listing 
effect persists through time and across countries.  Section III presents univariate tests of certain 
explanations of the listing effect.  Section IV presents results based on multivariate tests.  Section 
V concludes. 
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I. Sample selection, data, and methodology 
A. Sample and sources of data 
    Our sample includes acquisitions over the period January 1, 1996 through December 31, 
2001 by companies incorporated in the 17 Western European countries listed in Table I.1  An 
initial set of 28,242 “acquisitions” was obtained from the SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide Mergers 
and Acquisitions Database.  The database gives various information regarding the acquisition, 
including an initial announcement date, the dollar amount paid for the target, the amount of any 
liabilities assumed or paid off by the acquirer, the acquirer’s and the target’s Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code, the countries in which the acquirer and target were incorporated, and 
the method of payment for the target (cash, stock, debt or a combination).  The SDC database 
also reports whether the target’s shares were listed on an exchange. 
From the initial list, all acquisitions in which the amount paid for the target is not given 
or was less than $5 million are deleted.  Of the remaining 10,163 observations, 755 share 
repurchases and 146 duplicate announcements are also deleted.   
Stock price data used in our analyses are taken from Datastream.  Because stock price 
data for the acquiring company are not available on Datastream around the announcement date 
of the acquisition for 1,077 acquisitions, these, too, are deleted.   
Because we are interested only in completed control acquisitions, we require that the 
acquirer owned less than 10% of the shares of the target prior to the acquisition announcement 
and that the acquirer successfully sought to increase its ownership position to greater than 50%.  
Application of this requirement reduced the sample to 5,020 observations.   
                                                 
1 The initial sample included 18 countries, but Luxembourg dropped out when various screens were applied as 
discussed below. 
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We also deleted deals where the target’s listing status is something other than public, 
private, or subsidiary.2  This leaves 4,903 observations.  Finally, we eliminated transactions for 
which the previous year-end market value of the acquirer is missing, leaving us with a final 
sample of 4,429 acquisitions.  Of these, 735 of the targets were listed on an exchange; 1,956 
were unlisted stand-alone companies; and 1,738 were unlisted subsidiaries.  
Announcement period excess stock returns (APERs) are calculated using market-adjusted 
returns.  To implement this procedure, we subtract the daily return of the Datastream index for 
the acquirer’s home country from the acquirer’s daily stock return each day over the interval 
beginning two days prior to and ending two days after the announcement of the acquisition.  
These differences are summed to provide a 5-day APER that comprises our measure of the 
acquirer’s wealth creation.  We use the SDC announcement date as the announcement date for 
our study.  According to SDC, this is the date on which the deal was first publicly announced. 
We take the acquirer’s book value of debt and equity from Worldscope.  Because these 
data are not available for every transaction, our sample sizes for various tests differ depending on 
whether these variables are included in the analysis.  For each test, we report the sample size 
employed. 
B.  The sample by year and home country of the acquirer 
 Table I presents the number of acquisitions by year according to the home country of the 
acquirer.  The observations are reasonably evenly spread across years, although there is a lump 
in 2000.  Further, the sample is clearly dominated with acquisitions by U.K. firms.  Where 
appropriate in our tests, we separately consider U.K. acquirers or include a dummy variable for 
                                                 
2 For example, privatizations, joint ventures, and unidentified cases. 
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the U.K. to control for the possibility that U.K. acquisitions could overwhelm the results from 
other countries. 
  
II. Does the listing effect persist through time and across countries? 
 In this section, we consider univariate tests of APERs through time and across countries 
to determine the generality of the listing effect in acquirers’ announcement period stock returns.  
A. Set-up of the tables 
In the tables, we present the mean and median APERs for each sample along with the 
number of observations for acquirers of listed targets, for acquirers of all unlisted targets 
combined, and separately for acquirers of unlisted stand-alone companies and for acquirers of 
unlisted subsidiaries.  We test to determine whether the mean and median APER of each sample 
is significantly different from zero.  We also test whether the mean and median APERs for 
acquirers of listed targets are significantly different from the means and medians of the APERs 
for acquirers of unlisted stand-alone targets and for acquirers of subsidiary targets.   
There is also the question of whether the APERs for acquirers of unlisted stand-alone 
companies are significantly different from the APERs for the acquirers of unlisted subsidiaries.  
As it turns out, in only one case is the mean or median APER statistically significantly different 
(at the 0.05 level) between acquirers of unlisted stand-alone companies and acquirers of unlisted 
subsidiaries.  Thus, we do not present this statistic for any of the samples we consider.  
Additionally, we focus our discussion on mean APERs because mean and median APERs 
fundamentally tell the same story. 
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B. APERs by year of acquisition 
As shown in Table II, and consistent with studies based on U.S. acquisitions, the mean 
APER for acquirers of listed targets is negative (-0.38%) and not statistically significantly 
different from zero; the mean APER for acquirers of unlisted stand-alone companies is positive 
(1.51%) and highly statistically significantly different from zero (p-value < 0.01); and the mean 
APER for acquirers of subsidiaries is also positive (1.44%) and highly significantly different 
from zero (p-value < 0.01).  Perhaps of greatest importance, the mean APER for acquirers of 
unlisted stand-alone companies and the mean APER for acquirers of unlisted subsidiaries are 
both significantly greater than the mean APER for the acquirers of listed targets (both p-values < 
0.01).   
Also as shown in Table II, the results are not due to a few isolated years.  In no year is the 
mean APER for acquirers of listed targets significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level; 
whereas in every year, the mean APER for acquirers of unlisted stand-alone companies is 
positive and significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level and in every year but one, the 
mean APER for acquirers of unlisted subsidiaries is positive and significantly different from zero 
at the 0.01 level.  In the other year, it is positive and significant at the 0.05 level.  Again, and 
most importantly, in every year but one, the mean APER for acquirers of unlisted stand-alone 
companies and for acquirers of unlisted subsidiaries is significantly greater than the mean APER 
for acquirers of listed targets at the 0.01 level or better. 
So, how do these results compare with those from the U.S.?  Hansen and Lott (1996) 
report a mean excess return of –0.98% for acquirers of listed targets and a mean excess return of 
+1.15% for acquirers of unlisted targets.  Chang’s (1998) corresponding numbers are –1.49% 
and +1.45%.  Moeller et al (2003) and Fuller et al (2002) separate their sample of targets into 
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listed companies, stand-alone unlisted companies, and unlisted subsidiaries.  The average APERs 
for the three groups from Moeller et al are -0.40%, +1.80%, and +2.51%, respectively.  For 
Fuller et al, the equivalent numbers are -1.00%, +2.08% and +2.75%.  In all four studies, mean 
differences between bidders’ returns for acquisitions of listed and unlisted targets are significant 
at the 0.01 level.   
In terms of their signs, magnitudes, and statistical significance, our results line up quite 
closely with those from the U.S.  Apparently, the listing effect in acquirers’ announcement 
period stock returns is not unique to the U.S. 
C. APERs by home country of the bidder 
 To be certain that the listing effect is not simply a U.K. effect, we separately calculate 
APERs for U.K. acquirers and for non-U.K. acquirers.  As shown in the top two rows of Panel A 
in Table III, the pattern in the results for the two sets of acquirers is quite similar.  The mean 
APER for acquirers of unlisted targets, for both stand-alone companies and subsidiaries, is 
significantly greater than zero and significantly greater than the mean APER for acquirers of 
listed targets for both U.K. and non-U.K. acquirers.  To the extent that there is any difference 
between the two sets of acquirers, it is that non-U.K. acquirers do somewhat better in buying 
both listed and unlisted targets.  Thus, the listing effect in European acquirers’ announcement 
period stock returns is not just a U.K. effect.   
To further explore the generality of the listing effect in European acquirers’ stock returns, 
the remaining rows of Panel A give the APERs by the home country of the acquirer for each 
country in which acquirers made at least 30 acquisitions each of listed targets, unlisted stand-
alone companies, and unlisted subsidiaries.  These include, in alphabetical order, France, 
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Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden.  We group acquirers from other countries together 
as a separate “all-other” sample.   
 The results for the individual countries are largely consistent with the results for the full 
sample.  For no country is the mean APER for acquirers of listed targets significantly greater 
than zero at the 0.05 level, although it is positive in two countries.  In contrast, the mean APER 
for unlisted targets is significantly positive at the 0.05 level or better in five of the six countries.  
The lone exception is France.  In France, the mean APER for unlisted targets is positive, but not 
significantly greater than zero.  It is, however, significantly greater than the mean APER for 
acquirers of listed targets.  Thus, there is still a listing effect in France in that, on average, French 
acquirers of unlisted targets earn significantly higher announcement period excess returns than 
do French acquirers of listed targets.   
The only snag in the results based on individual countries is the all-other set.  For the all-
other sample, the mean APERs for acquirers of unlisted targets combined and separately for 
stand-alone companies and for subsidiaries are all positive and significantly greater than zero, 
but so is the mean APER for acquirers of listed targets.  Further, the mean APER for acquirers of 
unlisted targets is greater than the mean APER for acquirers of listed targets, but the difference is 
not statistically significant at even the 0.10 level.  Thus, in all other countries, there is still a 
listing effect, but it is modest and not statistically significant. 
 
III. Explanations of the listing effect in acquirers’ stock returns: Univariate tests 
 The results of section II demonstrate that the listing effect in acquirers’ stock returns is 
not isolated to the U.S.  Having established that, we now consider various explanations of the 
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listing effect.  These hypotheses, or perhaps conjectures on our part, derive from various sources 
and have received some support in studies based on U.S. data.   
A. APERS by method of payment 
For U.S. acquirers of unlisted targets, Chang (1998) reports a higher average 
announcement period return when payment for the target is in stock rather than cash.  He 
proposes that the listing effect could be a method of payment effect.  For U.S. acquirers of listed 
targets, Travlos (1987) reports a higher average announcement period return when payment for 
the target is in cash rather than stock.  Fuller et al (2002) confirm both findings.  It is possible 
that our results are due to the method of payment rather than the listing status of the target.  That 
could occur, for example, if most of the targets in our sample - - both listed and unlisted - - are 
bought with stock.  In that case, on average, if the results from the U.S. persist globally or at least 
across the Atlantic, acquirers of listed targets would earn small or negative excess returns and 
acquirers of unlisted targets would earn positive excess returns.   
To examine that possibility, we classify the method of payment into cash and stock where 
“cash” is defined as the total payment made in cash, non-contingent liabilities, and newly issued 
notes and “stock” is defined as payment in the form of shares of the acquiring company.3  We 
categorize transactions by method of payment as “all-cash,” “all-stock,” or “cash & stock.”   
 The top two rows of Panel A of Table IV give the fraction of all-cash deals and all-stock 
deals for each category of acquisition.  These data do not offer much support for the possibility 
that the listing effect is actually a method of payment effect as 59% of listed target acquisitions 
are all-cash deals and 78% of unlisted target acquisitions are all-cash deals.  Panel B of Table III 
gives direct evidence on whether the listing effect is actually a method of payment effect.  The 
                                                 
3 We make no claim to novelty with this grouping to identify acquisitions by method of payment.  For predecessors 
see, for example, Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) and Martin (1996). 
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results here are interesting and come in two parts.  First, as regards the question of whether the 
listing effect is a method of payment effect, the answer is no: Regardless of payment method, 
mean APERs of acquirers of unlisted targets, both stand-alone companies and subsidiaries, are 
significantly greater than zero and significantly greater than the mean APERs of acquirers of 
listed targets.  Furthermore, in no case is the mean APER for acquirers of listed targets 
significantly different from zero; for two of the three method-of-payment samples, it is negative 
and in the third, it is a small positive number.  Thus, the listing effect in acquirers’ announcement 
period stock returns is not a method-of-payment effect masquerading as a listing effect.   
The second interesting finding is that the results from the U.S. are confirmed in Europe in 
that APERs for acquirers of listed targets are higher when payment is made in cash rather than 
stock (0.30% v. –1.81%; p-value for the difference = 0.002); while APERs for acquirers of 
unlisted targets are higher when payment is made in stock rather cash (3.90% v. 1.17%; p-value 
for the difference < 0.001).  Thus, to the extent that there is a method of payment effect in U.S. 
acquirers’ stock returns, the same effect is at work in European acquirers’ stock returns.  
Nevertheless, of most importance for our purposes, the listing effect is not a method of payment 
effect in acquirers’ announcement period stock returns.   
B. APERs by whether a new blockholder is created 
For U.S. acquirers, Chang (1998) reports that average announcement period excess 
returns are significantly larger when the acquisition creates a blockholder in the acquiring 
company’s ownership structure.  This situation typically comes about because the bidder has 
paid for the target with stock.  Chang conjectures that “…the creation of an outside blockholder 
results in an increase in firm value through more efficient monitoring.” (p. 778.)  If unlisted 
targets tend to be more  closely held than are listed targets and if many are acquired with stock, 
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the fraction of unlisted acquisitions that give rise to blockholder creation may greatly exceed the 
fraction of listed acquisitions that give rise to blockholder creation.  If so, the apparent listing 
effect that we observe actually may be a blockholder creation effect.  As we noted above, 
however, most targets in our sample are acquired for cash.  Nevertheless, we explore the data to 
determine whether the listing effect might actually be a blockholder creation effect. 
As does Chang, we denote a blockholder as an investor who owns more than 5% of the 
acquirer’s stock.  Because none of our data sources indicate whether an acquisition created a 
blockholder in the acquirer, we calculate a proxy to identify whether the acquisition created a 
blockholder in the acquirer’s ownership structure.  To do so, for unlisted targets, we divide the 
market value of stock paid for the target by the sum of the market value of the acquirer’s 
common stock five days prior to announcement plus the market value of any stock issued to buy 
the target.  Implicit in this calculation is the assumption that unlisted targets are closely held.4  
For listed targets, we multiply this fraction by the percentage of shares held by the target’s 
largest shareholder.5  We classify acquirers as having a blockholder created by means of the 
acquisition if our proxy is 0.05 or greater.  
 The third row of Panel A of Table IV gives the fraction of acquirers in which a 
blockholder was created for each category of acquisition.  Contrary to Chang’s conjecture, in a 
slightly higher fraction of cases, (in our sample using our proxy at least) acquirers of listed 
targets structure the transaction in such a way as to create a blockholder in the acquiring 
company more often than do acquirers of unlisted targets.  That is, it is more often the case that a 
blockholder is created in the acquirers of listed targets than in the acquirers of unlisted targets. 
                                                 
4 To the extent that this assumption is invalid, of course, our tests will be prejudiced against finding any blockholder 
effect. 
5 Sources for the ownership data are given in Appendix A. 
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APERs according to whether a blockholder was created in the acquirer are given in Panel 
C of Table III.  The results here are easy to summarize.  Regardless of whether a blockholder is 
created, the mean APER for acquirers of unlisted targets, both stand-alone companies and 
subsidiaries, is positive and significantly greater than zero.  It is also significantly greater than 
the mean APER for the acquirers of listed targets.  Finally, regardless of whether the acquisition 
did or did not create a blockholder in the acquirer, the mean APER of the acquirer is not 
significantly different from zero.  Thus, these results indicate that the listing effect in European 
acquisitions is not a blockholder creation effect. 
C. APERS by size of the bidder 
Hints of a size effect in acquirer returns in which bigger buyers have lower 
announcement period returns appeared in Loderer and Martin (1990) and Schwert (2000).  
Moeller et al (2003) examine the issue exhaustively.  They document significantly higher 
announcement period returns for smaller acquiring firms regardless of the type of target, the 
method of payment, the size of the target, and a number of other deal and acquirer 
characteristics.  They also report, but do not discuss in detail, that buyers of unlisted targets, 
regardless of whether the targets are stand-alone companies or subsidiaries, have significantly 
higher announcement period returns than do buyers of listed targets.  It is possible that our 
results are really a “size of acquirer” effect in which bigger bidders tend to buy listed targets, 
while smaller bidders tend to buy unlisted stand-alone targets and subsidiaries.   
To address that possibility, we classify acquirers according to the market value of their 
common stock as of five days prior to the acquisition announcement where the market value of 
common stock is calculated as the number of shares outstanding times the market price per share.  
We then classify an acquirer as “big” if its market value is greater than the median market value 
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of all acquirers in our sample for the calendar year in which the acquisition was announced.  All 
others are “small.”  Mean and median market values of equity of the various categories of 
acquirers are given in the first row of Panel B of Table IV.  Unsurprisingly, acquirers of listed 
targets tend to be bigger than acquirers of unlisted targets.   
APERs for big and small acquirers are given in Panel D of Table III.  Interestingly, there 
is not a clear-cut size effect in acquirer announcement period stock returns.  Although both small 
and big acquirers earn negative APERs when buying listed targets, small bidders do somewhat 
worse than big bidders in this set of acquisitions.  In comparison, small bidders do somewhat 
better than big bidders when buying unlisted stand-alone targets and subsidiaries.  Nevertheless, 
both small and big bidders earn positive and significant excess returns when buying either type 
of unlisted target.  Furthermore, both small and big acquirers of unlisted targets achieve APERs 
that are significantly higher than those for small and big acquirers of listed targets.  Clearly, the 
listing effect in acquirers’ returns is not a size of buyer effect in disguise. 
D. APERs and “liquidity” of the target’s assets 
Fuller et al (2002) conjecture that the significant announcement period excess returns to 
buyers of unlisted targets reflect a “liquidity discount.”  They do not test to determine whether 
the difference in excess returns to acquirers of listed and unlisted targets is correlated with any 
measure of liquidity nor do they explain why sellers of unlisted targets are willing to accept a 
lower price than sellers of listed targets.  Furthermore, they offer no definition of what they mean 
by a liquidity discount.  Thus, their conjecture provides little guidance as to how to construct a 
test as to whether a liquidity discount might be at work in announcement period returns to 
acquirers.   
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The microstructure literature has wrestled mightily with the task of defining and 
measuring “liquidity” and seems to have settled on bid-ask spreads, trading volume, and price 
impacts as proxy measures of liquidity.  Similar attention has not been devoted to measuring and 
defining “liquidity” for real assets.  Nevertheless, Schlingemann, Stulz and Walkling (2002) 
have reported some success using aggregate dollar volume of “deals” for an asset class as a 
proxy measure of asset liquidity.  We follow their lead.   
In general, we compute our index as the total market value of intercorporate transactions 
during a specific time interval in a particular asset category divided by the total dollar value of 
assets in that category.  More specifically, for a given acquisition in our sample, the numerator of 
this index is the worldwide aggregate value of corporate “control” transactions that took place in 
the target’s 3-digit SIC industry classification over the interval beginning three months prior to 
and ending the month of the announcement of the acquisition in question.  This calculation 
excludes the acquisition being considered.   
In constructing the liquidity index, control transactions include leveraged buyouts, 
intercorporate tender offers, spinoffs of subsidiaries, purchases of minority stakes (i.e., toehold 
acquisitions), acquisitions of remaining interests, going private transactions, and equity carve-
outs.  We exclude intrafirm exchange offers and share repurchases.  The data for these 
transactions are taken from the SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide Mergers and Acquisitions Database.  
The denominator of the liquidity index is the aggregate worldwide market value of equity of 
publicly-traded stocks in the same three-digit SIC industry as the target.  This value is measured 
as of the beginning of the calendar year in which the acquisition is announced.  In one instance, 
the index is a small negative number.  In that case, we set the index equal to zero.  In 90 cases, 
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the value of the index is greater than 1.0.  In those cases, we set the value of the index to 1.0.6  
The mean and median level of the liquidity index for the various categories of acquirers is given 
in the second row in Panel B of Table IV.  We classify a target as having low "liquidity" when 
the liquidity index for its industry is below the median of the index for our sample of targets for 
the calendar year in which the acquisition was announced.  All other targets are classified as 
having high "liquidity". 
The APERs according to the liquidity of the target are given in Panel E of Table III.  The 
mean APERs for acquirers of both high and low liquidity listed targets are small and not 
significantly different from zero; the mean APERs for acquirers of both high and low liquidity 
unlisted stand-alone targets are positive and significantly greater than zero; and the mean APERs 
of acquirers of both high and low liquidity subsidiary targets are positive and significantly 
greater than zero.  Additionally, the mean APERs of acquirers of both types of high and low 
liquidity unlisted targets are significantly greater than the mean APER for acquirers of high and 
low liquidity listed targets.  Thus, these tests indicate that the listing effect is not just a liquidity 
effect.   
E. Dollar values of APERs 
Malatesta (1983), Dennis and McConnell (1986), and Moeller et al (2003) emphasize that 
the dollar values of gains or losses in acquisitions can give different inferences than equally-
weighted returns.  For example, acquirers may lose small amounts (in dollars) when buying most 
listed targets, but may more than make up for those losses when buying bigger listed targets.  In 
that case, the mean dollar values of APERs may be significantly positive even though the 
equally-weighted mean return is small or negative.  Contrarily, the opposite effect might be at 
                                                 
6 Negative observations come about because of errors in SDC or Worldscope.  It is possible, but unlikely that 
observations greater than 1.0 are legitimate.  Thus, we set the index at 1.0.  An alternative would be to exclude these 
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work in acquisitions of unlisted targets.  It may be that buyers of unlisted targets gain when 
buying most targets, but lose when buying a few big targets.   
To determine whether the dollar values of acquirer returns present a different picture than 
the equally-weighted APERs, we calculate the dollar value of the announcement period excess 
returns by multiplying each acquirer’s APER by the market value of its equity five days prior to 
the acquisition announcement.  We calculate the mean and median dollar values for each of the 
samples given in Tables II and III.  In general, the dollar values of announcement period excess 
returns yield inferences similar to those given by the equally-weighted APERs of Tables II and 
III.  We, thus, present and discuss only a few calculations.  
 As shown in Panel A of Table V, the mean dollar value of the announcement period 
excess returns for acquirers of listed targets is -$108.0 million, although the median loss is 
substantially less at -$0.7 million.  There are, thus, some very large dollar value losers among 
buyers of listed targets.   
For acquirers of unlisted targets, the mean dollar value of the announcement period 
returns of $33.6 million is positive and statistically significantly greater than zero and 
statistically significantly greater than the mean dollar value return to acquirers of listed targets.  
As with acquirers of listed targets, the distribution of dollar announcement period returns is 
skewed except in the opposite direction.  For buyers of unlisted targets, the median dollar value 
of announcement period returns is $1.5 million which is also significantly greater than zero and 
significantly greater than the median dollar return for acquirers of listed targets.  The story is 
very much the same when unlisted targets are split into stand-alone companies and subsidiaries.  
Thus, it is not the case that acquirers of listed targets lose a little on many transactions but make 
up those frequent small losses with a few “big hits.”  Similarly, it is not the case that acquirers of 
                                                                                                                                                             
observations.  
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unlisted targets earn a little on many transactions and lose big on a few deals.  Thus, the dollar 
values of the announcement returns do not overturn the implications based on equally-weighted 
returns.   
Also in Panel A of Table V, we split the sample into U.K. acquirers and non-U.K. 
acquirers.  For U.K. buyers of listed targets, the mean dollar value of announcement period 
excess returns is -$81.3 million; for non-U.K. acquirers, the mean dollar value of the 
announcement period excess return is similarly negative at -$132.3 million.  The mean and 
median dollar value of announcement period returns for unlisted targets combined and for stand-
alone and subsidiary targets separately are positive and greater than their corresponding levels 
for listed targets.  Thus, the dollar value announcement period excess returns tell the same story 
as the equally-weighted returns and the dollar value returns tell the same story for U.K. acquirers 
and for non-U.K. European acquirers.  Announcement period dollar value returns are higher for 
buyers of unlisted targets than for buyers of listed targets. 
Panel B of Table V, gives the dollar value of announcement period excess returns 
according to our definitions of big and small acquirers.  The mean dollar value announcement 
period return for big acquirers of listed targets is (big and negative) -$176.3 million; the mean 
dollar value announcement period return for small acquirers of listed targets is actually a small 
positive number.  This result hints that the listing effect may be a size effect.  But, the dollar 
value returns to acquirers of unlisted companies reverses that hint.  The mean dollar value 
announcement period return for big acquirers of unlisted targets is (also big but positive) $66.4 
million, while the mean dollar value announcement period excess return for small acquirers of 
unlisted targets is $3.6 million.  Additionally, regardless of whether they are big or small, 
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acquirers of unlisted targets earn significantly higher dollar value announcement period excess 
returns than do buyers of listed targets. 
Finally, in Panel C of Table IV, we consider dollar value excess returns according to 
method of payment.  The results are straightforward: regardless of method of payment, the mean 
dollar value of announcement period excess returns is negative for acquirers of listed targets and 
positive for acquirers of unlisted targets.   
F. Overpayment for listed targets as part of a portfolio 
 As we noted, Hansen and Lott (1996) propose that the listing effect comes about because 
diversified shareholders of acquirers do not care whether managers ‘overpay’ for shares of listed 
targets because the shares of those targets will be part of their diversified portfolios.  The same 
shareholders will, however, demand that managers not overpay for unlisted targets because 
shares of such targets cannot be part of their portfolios by virtue of the fact that they are not 
publicly-traded.  If that were the explanation of the listing effect, by logical extension, 
shareholders also would not care whether managers overpaid for subsidiaries of listed 
companies.  In our sample, 95% of the parents of the acquired subsidiaries are publicly-traded.  
Thus, the significant positive average APER for acquirers of subsidiaries is inconsistent with the 
Hansen and Lott argument.  Their reasoning seems an unlikely explanation of the listing effect in 
acquirers’ announcement period stock returns. 
 
IV. Multivariate tests  
Our univariate tests appear to demonstrate that the listing effect in acquirers’ 
announcement period excess returns that has been documented in the U.S. is widespread and not 
merely a manifestation of some peculiarity of U.S. markets.  It also appears to be “real” and not 
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merely camouflage for some other factor that influences acquirers’ returns.  We now turn to 
multivariate tests to determine whether the listing effect persists when we put it to the stiffer 
challenge of standing up to a panel of independent variables.   
A. Set up 
The dependent variable in our regressions is the 5-day APER.  As independent variables, 
we include an indicator for whether the acquirer is domiciled in the U.K. (1) or not (0), the log of 
the market value of the bidder’s common stock five days prior to the announcement, an indicator 
when payment was made in stock (1) or not (0), an indicator when payment was a combination 
of stock and cash (1) or not (0),7 and an indicator for whether a blockholder was created in the 
acquirer (1) or not (0).  These are the variables considered in our univariate tests. 
We also include as control variables factors shown to be correlated with acquirers’ 
announcement period excess returns in other studies.  Kang (1993) reports that Japanese 
acquirers earn positive and significant announcement period returns when they acquire U.S. 
targets, but a matching set of U.S. acquirers who also acquire U.S. targets earn zero or mildly 
negative announcement period excess returns.  His results suggest that cross-border transactions 
may have greater value to acquirers than domestic acquisitions.  For Canadian acquirers in 
comparison with U.S. acquirers, Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) report the opposite result - - 
Canadian acquirers of Canadian targets earn higher returns than do U.S. acquirers of Canadian 
targets.  It is possible that the listing effect in acquirer returns is actually a “cross-border” effect.  
It may be, for example, that unlisted targets tend to be cross-border acquisitions and listed targets 
tend to be within-border acquisitions, or vice versa.  As shown in the fourth row of Panel A of 
Table IV, approximately 50% of acquisitions of listed and unlisted acquisitions are cross-border 
                                                 
7 These two indicator variables capture the “method of payment” effect.  The omitted variable is “cash” payment. 
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transactions so this factor appears to be an unlikely candidate to explain the listing effect.  
Nevertheless, to account for a possible cross-border effect in acquirers’ returns, we include an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the bidder and the target are incorporated in different countries 
(and 0 otherwise).   
Malatesta (1983), Schipper and Thompson (1983), Malatesta and Thompson (1985), and 
Loderer and Martin (1990) report an “order” effect in bidder returns in which initial acquisitions by 
U.S. firms are associated with larger and more significant APERs than subsequent acquisitions.  
Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) and Fuller et al. (2002) find no order effect.  It is possible that 
unlisted targets tend to be the acquirers’ initial targets and listed targets only occur after one or more 
unlisted target acquisitions.  To capture the order effect, we classify an acquisition as an acquirer’s 
initial acquisition if the acquirer has not announced any other acquisitions during the two years prior 
to the acquisition in our sample.  As shown in the fifth row of Panel A of Table IV, approximately 
19% of listed target acquisitions are classified as initial acquisitions and about 17% of unlisted 
acquisitions are classified as initial acquisitions.  We use an indicator to identify whether an 
acquisition is an initial acquisition (1) or not (0). 
For U.S. acquirers, Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1989, 1991) and Servaes (1991) report that 
acquirers’ announcement period excess returns are higher when the acquirer’s Tobin’s Q is 
higher.  It could be that acquirers of unlisted targets tend to have higher Tobin’s Qs than 
acquirers of listed targets.  We calculate the acquirer’s Q ratio as the market value of the 
acquirer’s equity as of the calendar year-end prior to the announcement plus the book value of 
debt and preferred stock from the most recent financial statement prior to the acquisition 
announcement divided by the sum of the book value of equity, debt and preferred stock as of the 
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same date.  The mean and median values of the acquirer’s estimated Q ratio are given in the third 
row of Panel B of Table IV.   
Maquieira, Megginson, and Nail (1990) report that acquirers’ excess returns are higher in 
within-industry (i.e., non-diversifying) acquisitions.  It could be that unlisted targets tend to be 
from the same industry as the acquirer.  If so, the listing effect might really be a cross-industry 
effect.  We consider a transaction to be a within-industry acquisition if the bidder and the target 
have the same three-digit SIC code.  As shown in the sixth row of Panel A of Table IV, within-
industry acquisitions comprise 41% of listed acquisitions and 34% of unlisted acquisitions.  To 
control for whether the acquisition is within the same industry, we include an indicator variable 
equal to 1 when the target and the bidder have the same three-digit SIC code (and 0 otherwise).   
For U.S. acquirers, Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), 
Servaes (1991) and others report that the size of the target  relative to the size of the acquirer is 
positively correlated with the acquirer’s announcement period return.  Franks and Harris (1989), 
Eckbo and Thorburn (2000), and Bae, Kang, and Kim (2002) report similar results for the U.K., 
Canada, and Korea, respectively.  It is possible that acquirers of unlisted targets are larger in 
comparison with their targets than are acquirers of listed targets.  If so, it could be that the listing 
effect is actually a relative size effect.  We calculate relative size as the total amount paid for the 
target less the amount of any liabilities assumed or paid off by the acquirer divided by the market 
value of the acquirer as of the calendar year-end prior to the announcement.  The mean and 
median of the relative size variable for the various categories of acquisitions is given in the 
fourth row Panel B of Table IV. 
B. Regression results 
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The first regression includes an indicator variable for whether the target was a stand-
alone company (1) or not (0) and an indicator for whether the target was a subsidiary (1) or not 
(0).  The regression also includes each of the independent variables described above.  The results 
of this regression are given in the first column of Table VI.   
The coefficient of the market value of the equity of the acquirer is negative and 
significant.  Consistent with results from Moeller et al (2003), bigger bidders appear to be worse 
bidders in Europe as well as in the U.S.  Further, after adjusting for other factors, the coefficient 
of the U.K. indicator variable is negative and significant: in a multivariate context U.K. 
acquirers’ achieve lower announcement period excess returns than acquirers from other 
European countries.   
More importantly, for the purposes of this investigation, the listing effect is robust to the 
inclusion of a slew of independent variables in a multivariate analysis.  The coefficients of both 
the unlisted stand-alone company indicator variable and the unlisted subsidiary indicator variable 
are positive and highly statistically significant (p-values < 0.01).  Further, their magnitudes are 
such that they imply that the acquisition of an unlisted entity adds about 1.3% to the total market 
value of the acquiring company after taking into account other factors that have been shown to 
explain announcement period excess returns in corporate acquisitions. 
The second regression in Table VI is the same as the first except that we exclude the 
method of payment variables.  We do so because method of payment and blockholder creation 
appear to be highly correlated.  By dropping the method of payment, we allow the blockholder 
variable a greater chance of entering the regression significantly.  As the results in the second 
column indicate, the coefficient of the blockholder variable is positive, but it is still not 
statistically significant (the p-value is greater than 0.05).  The indicator variables for unlisted 
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stand-alone targets and subsidiary targets are still significant (at the 0.01 level or better) as are 
the acquirer size variable and the U.K. indicator variable.   
We also estimate separate regressions for acquirers of listed targets, unlisted stand-alone 
targets, and unlisted subsidiaries.  We include the same independent variables as in the first two 
regressions except that we enter the method of payment variable in the first regression in each 
pair and the blockholder creation indicator variable in the second regression in each pair.  The 
coefficients of these regressions are given in the remaining columns of Table VI.  Several results 
are worth mentioning.  First, the coefficient of the U.K. indicator variable has the same sign and 
magnitude in each regression as in the full sample regression, but is not significant in any of the 
subsample regressions.  Second, the coefficient of the all-stock transaction variable is negative 
and significant for acquirers of listed targets and positive and significant for acquirers of unlisted 
targets.  This result is consistent with studies using U.S. data.  Third, as with the method of 
payment variable, the blockholder creation variable has opposite signs for acquirers of listed and 
unlisted targets.  For listed targets, the creation of a blockholder is associated with a lower excess 
return.  For unlisted stand-alone targets and for subsidiaries, the sign is positive indicating that 
creation of a blockholder is associated with a higher excess return for the acquirer.  Whether this 
factor is really a method of payment or a blockholder creation variable awaits further analysis.  
Finally, for acquirers of listed targets, the size of the acquirer is no longer significant, but it is 
significant for acquirers of unlisted targets.  We present these results to complete our analysis 
and for symmetry with U.S. studies that have examined announcement period returns separately 
for listed and unlisted targets.  Our primary interest is in whether the differential in 
announcement period returns for listed and unlisted targets that has been documented for U.S. 
acquisitions persists elsewhere.  The answer is a resounding yes.  The downside is that our 
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analysis does not identify what the fundamental factors are that give rise to the listing effect in 
the wealth creation of corporate acquirers. 
C. Tests of robustness 
 As is the case with most empirical studies, implementation of our tests required that we 
make decisions regarding the data and sample as we progressed.  In this section, we examine the 
sensitivity of our results to alternative choices.   
 To begin, we re-calculated APERs over the interval from 5 days before through 5 days 
after the announcement date and over the interval from one day before through one day after the 
announcement date.  The mean APERs over the two intervals are -0.20% (p-value = 0.62) and -
0.27% (p-value = 0.32) for listed targets, and 1.78% (p-value < 0.001) and 1.29% (p-value < 
0.001) for unlisted targets.  Importantly, for both intervals, the mean APERs for unlisted targets 
are significantly higher than the mean APERs for listed targets.  With these APERs, we re-
estimated the first two regressions in Table VI.  In each of the four regressions, the p-values of 
the coefficients of the stand-alone indicator and the subsidiary indicator are all less than 0.03 and 
most are less than 0.01.8  Thus, in a multivariate analysis, the returns to acquirers of unlisted 
targets are significantly greater than the returns to acquirers of listed targets. 
 We then evaluated the sensitivity of the results to alternative specifications of certain of 
the independent variables.  First, we re-estimated the regressions using the logarithm of the 
acquirer’s book value of the acquirer’s assets as the measure of acquirer size.  The coefficients of 
the stand-alone indicator and the subsidiary indicator continue to have p–values of less than 0.01, 
as does the size of the acquirer.  Second, we estimated the regressions using the cut-off of 10% 
share ownership and 20% share ownership to identify whether a new blockholder was created in 
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the acquirer’s ownership structure.  With these specifications, the p-values of the blockholder 
creation indicator variable comes close to significance with p-values of 0.14 and 0.08.  Still, 
blockholder creation does not drive out the listing effect as the p-values of the coefficients of 
stand-alone indicator and the subsidiary indicator are still less than 0.01.  Third, we aggregate 
deals wholly financed with stocks and those financed partially with stock to comprise a new 
method of payment variable.  This method of payment variable is still not significant for the 
whole sample, while the p-values of the coefficients of stand-alone indicator and the subsidiary 
indicator are still less than 0.01.   
 We then turn to some alternative specifications for liquidity.  First, we measure liquidity 
as we did before except we used the six (rather than three) month interval prior to the acquisition 
announcement.  The liquidity index is still not significant at conventional levels (p-value=0.14), 
while the coefficients of stand-alone indicator and the subsidiary indicator continue to have p-
values less than 0.01.  We then define liquidity as the worldwide value of corporate control 
transactions that took place in the target’s 3-digit SIC industry classification over the interval 
beginning three (six) months prior to and ending the month of the announcement of the 
acquisition in question, excluding the acquisition being considered, without normalizing for the 
size of the industry these specifications.  The liquidity variable comes close to significance at 
both the three and six month intervals with p-values of 0.10 and 0.08.  But even here, the 
liquidity index does not drive out the unlisted stand-alone target indicator variable and the 
unlisted subsidiary indicator variable which continue to have p-values less than 0.01.   
 
V. Conclusion 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 The coefficients of the size of the acquirer are also always negative and significant and the relative size of the 
target to the size of the acquirer is negative and significant in each regression, but the U.K indicator loses 
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 This study investigates the wealth created for shareholders around announcements of 
acquisitions by acquirers of listed and unlisted targets in 17 Western European countries over the 
period 1996 through 2001.  As in the U.S., acquirers of listed companies earn zero or slightly 
negative average announcement period excess returns, whereas acquirers of unlisted targets earn 
positive and significant average announcement period excess returns.  Furthermore, the wealth 
increase associated with acquisitions of unlisted targets is significantly greater than the wealth 
increase associated with listed targets and this differential is pervasive.  It persists across 
countries and through time.  In cross-sectional regressions in which announcement period excess 
returns are the dependent variable, the listing effect is robust to inclusion of a variety of variables 
including size of the acquirer, the method of payment for the target (cash, stock or a 
combination), whether the acquisition created a blockholder in the acquiring company, a measure 
of the “liquidity” of the target company’s assets, the acquirer’s Tobin’s Q ratio, the relative size 
of the target and bidder firms, whether the acquisition was a cross-border deal, whether the 
bidder and the target were in the same industry, and whether the acquisition was the bidder’s 
“initial” acquisition.   
 Presumably the listing effect in acquirers’ stock returns is a manifestation of some 
economic phenomenon that our various proxy variables have failed to capture.  Further 
investigation will be required to identify what that fundamental factor is or those fundamental 
factors are.  In the meantime, managers who are evaluating alternative acquisitions may wish to 
take into account the listing status of target companies.  
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Appendix A. Data sources for targets’ ownership structure 
 
Country: Data sources: 
Argentina Worldscope 
Australia Australian Stock Exchange, “ASX all Ordinary Index. Company Handbook”, Sydney, 
N.S.W. and http://www.companies.govt.nz/search/cad/dbssiten.main 
Austria Wiener Börse, “Yearbook”, Österreichische Vereinigung für Finanzanalyse, Wien 
Belgium Banque Bruxelles Lambert, “Actionnariat des Sociétés Belges cotées à Bruxelles”, 
Département Etudes et Stratégie. 
Bermuda Worldscope 
Brazil São Paulo Stock Exchange, “Brazil company handbook” 
Canada The Financial Post, “Survey of Industrials”; company web sites from: 
http://www.tse.com/, and Worldscope 
Chile Worldscope 
Colombia Worldscope 
Czech Republic File purchased from the Securities Center of the Czech Republic 
Denmark Worldscope 
Egypt Worldscope 
Estonia http://www.tse.ee/english/  
Finland http://www.huginonline.com/; company web sites from: http://www.hex.fi 
France The Herald Tribune, “French Company Handbook,” SBF-Paris Bourse; 
http://www.bourse-de-paris.fr/fr/index_fs.htm?nc=2&ni=6&nom=marche; company 
web sites from:  http://www.euronext.com/fr/ 
Germany Commerzbank, “Wer gehört zu Wem”;  Bundesaufsichtsamt für den 
Wertpapierhandel, “Major Holdings of Voting Rights in Officially Listed Companies” 
Greece Worldscope  
Hungary Worldscope 
Indonesia Asian Company Handbook 
Ireland-Rep London Stock Exchange, “The London Stock Exchange Yearbook”; 
http://www.hemscott.co.uk/equities/ 
Italy http://www.consob.it/ 
Japan Toyo Keizai Shanposha, “Japan Company Handbook”, Tokyo, Japan 
Lithuania Worldscope 
Luxembourg Worldscope 




New Zealand Datex, “New Zealand Directory of Shareholders” (http://www.datex.co.nz/) 
Norway http://www.huginonline.com/; company web sites from: http://www.ose.no/english/ 
Philippines Asian Company Handbook; Philippine Stock Exchange 
Poland Komisja Papierów Wartościowych i Gield, Ownership of Polish listed firms  
Portugal Bolsa de Valores de Lisboa e Porto, “Sociedades Cotadas”, CD-Rom 
Romania http://www.bvb.ro/; Worldscope 
Russian Fed Worldscope 
Singapore Asian Company Handbook 
Slovak Repub. Worldscope 
Slovenia http://www.ljse.si/; Worldscope 
South Africa Worldscope 
South Korea Asian Company Handbook 
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Spain Comision Nacional del Mercado de Valores, “Participaciones significativas en 
sociedades cotizadas”; http://www.cnmv.es/english/cnmve.htm 
Sweden http://www.huginonline.com/  
Switzerland Union Bank of Switzerland, “Swiss Stock Guide,” Zurich 
Thailand Asian Company Handbook 
United Kingdom London Stock Exchange, “The London Stock Exchange Yearbook”; 
http://www.hemscott.co.uk/equities/  
United States http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/srch-edgar/  
Table I. Distribution of acquisitions by home country of the acquirer and announcement year 
 
The sample consists of acquisitions by 4,429 bidders from 17 European countries.  Acquisitions are listed by year of announcement 
according to SDC PlatinumTM Worldwide Mergers and Acquisitions Database.  Only successful control acquisitions valued at US 
$5 million or more are included. 
 
Home country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 All
of acquirer
Austria 0 1 2 9 3 3 18
Belgium 3 4 16 17 20 10 70
Denmark 3 6 7 17 21 10 64
Finland 5 8 15 16 30 14 88
France 21 40 37 62 83 44 287
Germany 13 20 30 33 51 36 183
Greece 0 1 3 3 4 10 21
Ireland 17 16 22 24 33 11 123
Italy 6 12 30 28 53 35 164
Netherlands 12 21 32 44 45 24 178
Norway 15 14 21 10 11 12 83
Portugal 1 1 5 3 11 2 23
Spain 7 15 22 31 33 11 119
Sweden 18 26 17 51 48 25 185
Switzerland 9 7 11 12 17 13 69
Turkey 0 1 1 0 1 1 4
United Kingdom 327 438 552 544 547 342 2750




Table II. Acquirers’ announcement period excess returns (APER) in percent  
by year and listing status of the target 
 
Acquirers’ five-day percentage APERs and associated statistics.  The APER for each acquisition is calculated by summing the 
difference between the acquirer’s stock return and the return of the Datastream stock market index of the acquirer’s home country 
over the interval beginning two days prior to the announcement of the acquisition and ending two days after the announcement.  
Columns (1) and (2) give data for acquisitions of listed and unlisted targets, respectively.  Column (4) gives data for unlisted stand-
alone targets and column (6) gives data for unlisted subsidiary targets.  The top number for each group is the acquirer’s mean 
percentage APER, the second number is the acquirer’s median percentage APER, the third number is the number of observations.  
a = significant at 0.01, b = significant at 0.05.  Significance for means is based on the t-test.  Significance for medians is based on 
the signed-ranks test.   Columns (3), (5) and (7) show, respectively, differences between the means and medians for columns (2) 
and (1), (3) and (1), and (4) and (1).  Significance for differences between means is based on the t-test.  Significance for differences 





All years -0.38 1.48 a 1.86 a 1.51 a 1.90 a 1.44 a 1.82 a
-0.39 0.64 a 1.03 a 0.58 a 0.98 a 0.66 a 1.05 a
735 3694 1956 1738
1996 0.78 1.32 a 0.54 1.22 a 0.45 1.42 a 0.64
-0.14 0.74 a 0.88 0.76 a 0.90 0.71 a 0.85
71 386 200 186
1997 -0.37 1.11 a 1.47 a 1.22 a 1.59 a 0.97 a 1.34 b
-0.55 0.33 a 0.89 b 0.45 a 1.00 a 0.05 0.61
103 528 283 245
1998 -0.33 1.40 a 1.73 a 1.03 a 1.35 b 1.82 a 2.15 a
-0.45 0.71 a 1.15 a 0.51 a 0.95 b 0.81 a 1.25 a
122 701 370 331
1999 0.53 2.28 a 1.74 a 2.29 a 1.76 a 2.26 a 1.72 b
0.15 1.17 a 1.01 b 0.93 a 0.77 1.51 a 1.36 a
180 724 383 341
2000 -1.36 1.21 a 2.57 a 1.53 a 2.89 a 0.82 b 2.19 a
-1.17 b 0.48 a 1.65 a 0.49 a 1.66 a 0.47 b 1.64 a
175 836 454 382
2001 -1.40 1.40 a 2.80 a 1.55 b 2.95 b 1.24 a 2.64 b
-0.68 0.56 a 1.25 0.53 b 1.22 0.61 b 1.29
84 519 266 253
Difference subsidiary DifferenceListed unlisted Difference stand-alone
targets targets targets col (6) - col (1)col (2) - col (1) col (4) - col (1)
(7)(1) (2) (4) (6)(3) (5)
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Table III. Acquirers’ announcement period excess returns (APER) in percent  
by characteristics of acquirer, deal, target and listing status of the target 
 
Acquirers’ five-day percentage APERs and associated statistics.  The APER for each acquisition is calculated by summing the 
difference between the acquirer’s stock return and the return of the Datastream stock market index of the acquirer’s home country 
over the interval beginning two days prior to the announcement of the acquisition and ending two days after the announcement.  
Columns (1) and (2) give data for acquisitions of listed and unlisted targets, respectively.  Column (4) gives data for unlisted stand-
alone targets and column (6) gives data for unlisted subsidiary targets.  The top number for each group is the acquirer’s mean 
percentage APER, the second number is the acquirer’s median percentage APER, the third number is the number of observations.  
a = significant at 0.01, b = significant at 0.05.  Significance for means is based on the t-test.  Significance for medians is based on 
the signed-ranks test.   Columns (3), (5) and (7) show, respectively, differences between the means and medians for columns (2) 
and (1), (3) and (1), and (4) and (1).  Significance for differences between means is based on the t-test.  Significance for differences 




All non-UK 0.28 1.75 a 1.47 a 1.8 a 1.52 a 1.71 a 1.42 a
0.02 0.79 a 0.78 a 0.89 a 0.87 a 0.76 a 0.74 a
385 1294 562 732
UK -1.12 b 1.33 a 2.45 a 1.39 a 2.51 a 1.25 a 2.37 a
-1.03 b 0.57 a 1.60 a 0.53 a 1.56 a 0.64 a 1.67 a
350 2400 1394 1006
France -1.18 0.66 1.84 b 0.37 1.55 0.84 2.02 b
-1.59 b 0.17 1.76 b -0.16 1.44 0.39 1.98 b
76 211 80 131
Germany -2.14 1.41 b 3.55 a 1.61 3.75 b 1.32 b 3.45 b
-0.55 0.78 b 1.32 a 0.59 1.13 b 0.78 1.32 a
39 144 48 96
Italy 0.88 2.06 a 1.18 3.70 b 2.82 0.68 -0.20
0.96 0.90 b -0.06 1.90 b 0.94 0.53 -0.43
33 131 60 71
Netherlands -0.01 2.59 a 2.59 a 1.84 1.84 2.93 a 2.94 a
-0.49 1.47 a 1.96 b 1.28 b 1.76 1.96 a 2.45 b
58 120 38 82
Sweden 1.33 2.56 a 1.23 3.62 b 2.29 1.69 b 0.36
0.97 1.70 a 0.73 1.80 a 0.83 1.56 b 0.59
43 142 64 78
All other 1.44 b 1.78 a 0.35 1.41 a -0.03 2.15 a 0.72
0.72 0.69 a -0.03 0.50 a -0.21 0.84 a 0.13
136 546 272 274
(7)(1) (2) (4) (6)(3) (5)
targets targets targets col (6) - col (1)col (2) - col (1) col (4) - col (1)
Panel A: By home country of acquirer








Cash 0.30 1.17 a 0.86 a 1.15 a 0.85 b 1.18 a 0.88 a
0.01 0.53 a 0.52 a 0.39 a 0.38 a 0.62 a 0.62 a
436 2876 1353 1523
Stock -1.81 b 3.90 a 5.72 a 4.07 a 5.88 a 3.55 b 5.36 a
-1.36 a 1.47 a 2.83 a 1.32 a 2.68 a 1.61 b 2.97 a
189 201 138 63
Mixed -0.66 2.14 a 2.81 a 1.80 a 2.46 b 3.18 a 3.85 a
-0.71 1.12 a 1.83 a 1.04 a 1.75 a 1.79 a 2.50 a
110 617 465 152
None 0.37 1.21 a 0.85 a 1.22 a 0.85 a 1.21 a 0.85 a
0.01 0.56 a 0.55 a 0.48 a 0.47 a 0.64 a 0.63 a
552 3308 1703 1605
At 5% -1.80 3.73 a 5.52 a 3.49 a 5.29 a 4.17 a 5.97 a
-1.85 1.58 a 3.43 a 1.57 a 3.43 a 1.61 a 3.47 a
78 386 253 133
Small -0.58 1.93 a 2.51 a 1.97 a 2.55 a 1.87 a 2.44 a
-0.24 0.73 a 0.97 a 0.73 a 0.97 a 0.74 a 0.98 a
283 1929 1169 760
Big -0.26 0.98 a 1.25 a 0.82 a 1.09 a 1.11 a 1.37 a
-0.45 0.53 a 0.97 a 0.36 a 0.81 a 0.60 a 1.04 a
452 1765 787 978
Panel B: By method of payment
Panel C: By blockholder creation
Panel D: By size of acquirer (i.e. market value of acquirer's equity)
(5) (6) (7)(1) (2) (3) (4)
Difference subsidiary Difference
targets col (2) - col (1) targets col (4) - col (1) targets col (6) - col (1)
Listed unlisted Difference stand-alone
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Panel E: By liquidity of target's assets
Low 0.07 1.71 a 1.64 a 1.62 a 1.55 a 1.84 a 1.77 a
-0.15 0.77 a 0.93 a 0.49 a 0.64 a 1.11 a 1.27 a
386 1781 1007 774
High -0.87 1.27 a 2.14 a 1.41 a 2.28 a 1.13 a 2.00 a
-0.67 b 0.56 a 1.22 a 0.65 a 1.32 a 0.49 a 1.15 a
316 1854 922 932
(5) (6) (7)(1) (2) (3) (4)
Difference subsidiary Difference
targets col (2) - col (1) targets col (4) - col (1) targets col (6) - col (1)
Listed unlisted Difference stand-alone
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Table IV.  Descriptive statistics for deal, acquirer and target companies by listing status of target 
 
An acquisition is all-stock if only stock is used as payment for the target.  An acquisition is all-cash if only cash is used as payment 
for the target.  For listed targets, a blockholder is created if the value of stock payment to the target’s largest shareholder exceeds 
5% of the acquirer’s market value.  For unlisted targets, a blockholder is created if the total value of stock payment exceeds 5% of 
the acquirer’s market value.  An acquisition is classified as cross-border if the acquirer and the target are incorporated in different 
countries.  An acquisition is classified as initial if the acquirer has not made any other acquisition announcements over the previous 
two years.  An acquisition is classified as within-industry if the target has the same primary 3-digit SIC code as the acquirer.  The 
acquirer’s market capitalization is the market value of acquirer’s common stock as of five days prior to the acquisition 
announcement.  The liquidity index is computed as the worldwide aggregate market value of corporate control transactions that 
took place in the target’s 3-digit SIC industry classification over the interval beginning three months prior to and ending the month 
of the announcement of the acquisition in question, excluding the acquisition being considered, divided by the aggregate 
worldwide market value of equity of publicly-traded stocks in the same 3-digit SIC industry as the target, measured as of the 
beginning of the calendar year in which the acquisition is announced.  The Tobin’s Q ratio is the market value of the acquirer’s 
equity as of the calendar year-end prior to the announcement plus the book value of debt and preferred stock from the most recent 
financial statement prior to the acquisition announcement divided by the sum of the book value of equity, debt and preferred stock 
as of the same date.  Target/acquirer relative market value is the total amount paid for the target less the amount of any liabilities 




Variable targets targets targets targets
Panel A: Binary variables
Fraction of all-stock acquisitions 0.257 0.054 0.071 0.036
Fraction of all-cash acquisitions 0.593 0.779 0.692 0.876
Fraction of acquisitions with blockholder created 0.124 0.104 0.129 0.077
Fraction of cross-border acquisitions 0.498 0.500 0.492 0.509
Fraction classified as initial acquisition 0.193 0.167 0.169 0.165
Fraction of within industry acquisitions 0.407 0.337 0.339 0.334
Panel B: Continuous variables
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Acquirer's market captalization (US $ millions) 8,879 1,428 4,505 555 3,220 407 5,950 846
Liquidity index 0.051 0.028 0.063 0.032 0.058 0.030 0.069 0.035
Acquirer's Tobin's Q ratio 2.40 1.46 2.63 1.66 3.11 1.87 2.08 1.44






Table V. Acquirers’ announcement period excess returns (APER) in US millions of dollars  
by characteristics of acquirer, deal, target and listing status of the target 
 
Dollar value of acquirers’ five-day APERs (in millions US) and associated statistics.  The dollar value of APER for each 
acquisition is calculated by summing the difference between the acquirer’s stock return and the return of the Datastream stock 
market index of the acquirer’s home country over the interval beginning two days prior to the announcement of the acquisition and 
ending two days after the announcement, and multiplying the result by the acquirer's market value of equity five days prior to the 
acquisition announcement.  Columns (1) and (2) give data for acquisitions of listed and unlisted targets, respectively.  Column (4) 
gives data for unlisted stand-alone targets and column (6) gives data for unlisted subsidiary targets.  The top number for each group 
is the acquirer’s mean percentage APER, the second number is the acquirer’s median percentage APER, the third number is the 
number of observations.  a = significant at 0.01, b = significant at 0.05.  Significance for means is based on the t-test.  Significance 
for medians is based on the signed-ranks test.   Columns (3), (5) and (7) show, respectively, differences between the means and 
medians for columns (2) and (1), (3) and (1), and (4) and (1).  Significance for differences between means is based on the t-test.  




Panel A: By home country of acquirer
All countries -108.0 33.6 a 141.6 a 22.5 b 130.5 b 46.1 b 154.1 a
-0.7 1.5 a 2.2 a 1.2 a 1.9 a 2.1 a 2.8 a
735 3694 1956 1738
non-UK -132.3 61.7 b 194.1 b 37.8 170.1 b 80.1 212.4 b
0.4 3.7 a 3.3 a 2.8 a 2.5 b 5.3 a 4.9 a
385 1294 562 732
UK -81.3 18.4 99.7 16.3 b 97.6 21.3 102.6
-1.1 b 0.9 a 2.0 a 0.7 a 1.8 a 1.2 a 2.3 a
350 2400 1394 1006
Small 1.1 3.6 a 2.5 b 3.3 a 2.2 4.0 a 2.9 b
-0.1 0.8 a 0.9 a 0.8 a 0.8 a 0.9 a 0.9 a
283 1929 1169 760
Big -176.3 66.4 a 242.7 a 50.9 b 227.3 a 78.8 b 255.1 a
-16.7 b 10.9 a 27.6 a 6.6 a 23.2 a 17.1 a 33.8 a
452 1765 787 978
Difference subsidiary Difference
targets
Listed unlisted Difference stand-alone
targets col (2) - col (1)
Panel B: By size of acquirer (i.e. market value of acquirer's equity)
targets col (4) - col (1) col (6) - col (1)








Cash -38.5 23.7 62.2 15.3 53.9 31.1 69.6
0.0 1.6 a 1.6 a 1.1 a 1.1 b 2.3 a 2.2 a
436 2876 1353 1523
Stock -88.1 92.2 b 180.3 113.6 b 201.6 45.5 133.5
-1.1 b 2.4 a 3.6 a 2.3 a 3.4 a 7.4 a 8.5 a
189 201 138 63
Mixed -417.7 60.6 478.4 b 16.2 433.9 196.5 614.3 b
-0.9 1.1 a 2.0 b 1.1 a 2.0 1.2 a 2.2 b
110 617 465 152
Panel C: By method of payment
(5) (6) (7)(1) (2) (3) (4)
Difference subsidiary Difference
targets col (2) - col (1) targets col (4) - col (1) targets col (6) - col (1)
Listed unlisted Difference stand-alone
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Table VI. Regressions explaining acquirers’ announcement period excess returns (APER) 
 
The dependent variable is the acquirer’s five-day percentage APER.  “Stand-alone target” and “subsidiary target” are dummy 
variables that take the value of one for acquisitions of unlisted stand-alone companies and unlisted subsidiaries, respectively.  “All-
stock acquisition” is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if only stock is used as payment.  “Cash-and-stock acquisition” 
is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if both cash and stock are used as payment.  “Blockholder created” is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the value of stock payment to a listed target’s largest shareholder exceeds 5% of the bidder’s 
market value, or if the total value of stock payment to an unlisted target exceeds 5% of the bidder’s market value.  “Acquirer size” 
is the natural logarithm of the market value of acquirer’s common stock as of five days prior to the acquisition announcement.  
“Liquidity index” is computed as the worldwide aggregate value of corporate control transactions that took place in the target’s 3-
digit SIC industry classification over the interval beginning three months prior to and ending the month of the announcement of the 
acquisition in question, excluding that acquisition, divided by the aggregate worldwide market value of equity of publicly-traded 
stocks in the same 3-digit SIC industry as the target, measured as of the end of the calendar year preceding the year of the 
acquisition announcement.  “Cross-border acquisition” is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the bidder and the target 
are incorporated in different countries.  “Initial acquisition” is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the bidder has not 
made any other acquisition announcements over the previous two years.  “Acquirer Tobin’s Q” is the market value of the 
acquirer’s equity as of the calendar year-end prior to the announcement plus the book value of debt and preferred stock from the 
most recent financial statement prior to the acquisition announcement divided by the sum of the book value of equity, debt and 
preferred stock as of the same date.   “Within industry” is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the target has the same 
primary 3-digit SIC code as the acquirer.  “Relative market value” is the total amount paid for the target less the amount of any 
liabilities assumed or paid by the acquirer divided by the market value of the acquirer as of the calendar year-end prior to the 
announcement.  “UK acquirer” is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the bidder is incorporated in the UK.  a = 
significant at 0.01, b = significant at 0.05.  Significance is based on White (1980) heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors.  
 
Unlisted Unlisted
All targets Listed targets stand-alone targets subsidiary targets
Independent variable
Constant 3.6354 a 3.7463 a 5.2704 b 5.2260 b 5.6756 a 5.4117 a 4.0560 a 4.1537 a
Stand-alone target 1.2775 a 1.2651 a
Subsidiary target 1.3965 a 1.3476 a
All-stock acquisition 0.3251 -0.6399 1.8787 0.4645
Cash-and-stock acquisition 0.3309 1.4060 -0.1704 0.4688
Blockholder created 1.0868 1.3484 -1.3571 -1.6898 1.1136 1.7095 b 2.2033 2.6287 b
Acquirer size -0.2471 a -0.2509 a -0.3301 -0.3195 -0.2678 b -0.2431 b -0.2372 b -0.2435 b
Liquidity index -0.7560 -0.7322 -1.6105 -1.7741 0.0851 0.1916 -1.0279 -1.0159
Cross-border acquisition 0.1532 0.1307 0.8000 0.7301 -0.7360 -0.7228 0.8510 0.8443
Initial acquisition 0.4406 0.4310 1.0796 0.9865 -0.1278 -0.1044 0.9034 0.8912
Acquirer Tobin's Q 0.0164 0.0216 -0.0857 -0.0905 0.0051 0.0204 0.0550 0.0655
Within industry 0.0029 0.0114 0.1636 0.1466 -0.0675 -0.0907 0.0622 0.0658
Relative market value 0.0000 -0.0026 -0.0054 -0.5068 0.0000 0.0022 -0.0001 -0.0085
UK acquirer -0.7520 a -0.7381 a -0.9632 -0.8513 -0.6783 -0.8258 -0.3634 -0.3691
Number of observations 4206 4206 597 597 1913 1913 1696 1696
Adjusted R-squared 0.011 0.014 0.010 0.0081 0.011 0.009 0.016 0.017
p-value of F-test 0.000 0.000 0.117 0.131 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000
(5) (6) (7) (8)(1) (2) (3) (4)
 
 
